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In recent years, English welfare and health policy has started to include pregnancy
within the foundation stage of child development. The foetus is also increasingly
designated as ‘at risk’ from pregnant women. In this article, we draw on an analysis
of a purposive sample of English social and welfare policies and closely related
advocacy documents to trace the emergence of neuroscientific claims-making in
relation to the family. In this article, we show that a specific deterministic under-
standing of the developing brain that only has a loose relationship with current
scientific evidence is an important component in these changes. We examine the
ways in which pregnancy is situated in these debates. In these debates, maternal stress
is identified as a risk to the foetus; however, the selective concern with women living
in disadvantage undermines biological claims. The policy claim of neurological ‘cri-
tical windows’ also seems to be influenced by social concerns. Hence, these emerging
concerns over the foetus’ developing brain seem to be situated within the gendered
history of policing women’s pregnant bodies rather than acting on new insights from
scientific discoveries. By situating these developments within the broader framework
of risk consciousness, we can link these changes to wider understandings of the ‘at
risk’ child and intensified surveillance over family life.
Keywords: pregnancy; risk; family policy; neuroscience; maternal stress; foetal devel-
opment; risk consciousness
Introduction
In 2001, the Labour Government commissioned and developed a framework around the
care and education for young children called ‘Birth to three matters’. The framework
involved academic work as well as resources for early-years practitioners, and it was to
compliment the Foundation Stage of the National Curriculum that set out educational aims
for 3–5-year-olds. In 2010, the Cabinet Office published a report by Frank Fields, an MP
and former Labour Government Minister, that recommended that the Foundation stage
needed to be extended to include ‘the womb to five’ (2010, p. 6). In this article, we
examine the ways in which the inclusion of pregnancy within the Foundation stage, with
the accompanying understanding that the foetus is ‘at risk’ from pregnant women, has
been influenced by specific understandings of the developing brain.
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In this article, we explore emerging concerns over the foetus’ developing brain in UK
government policy documents and discuss how this links to the construction of women as
a primary risk factor. We argue that the current focus on pregnancy needs to be situated
within the history of restrictions and advice given to pregnant women and normative
constructions of ‘good mothering’. We show how the notion that pregnancy is a ‘critical
period’ in brain development is used as a mechanism for getting access to families
deemed to be ‘resistant to support’. Consequently, we argue that whilst the policymakers
claiming that new scientific discoveries justify their approach, in reality such policies are a
continuation of the gendered policing of women’s bodies.
Risk, pregnancy and the development of the foetal brain
Policing pregnancy
As Hays (1996) has noted, in the late twentieth century there was a change in expectations
around motherhood. She argued that ideas about appropriate childcare intensified for
middle-class women. Intensive motherhood involves seeing motherhood as a project in
which women need to put their child’s needs first, and follow expert guidance on
investing physically, emotionally and financially to ensure the best outcome. This is in
contrast to earlier versions of ‘good motherhood’ in which keeping children fed, clean,
warm and safe were emphasised more. Although individual mothering practices often
vary from normative models, the idea of following a rational plan to try to maximise child
development has nevertheless come to dominate understandings, whether or not it is
embraced or rejected (Smyth, 2012). Moreover, the ability to ‘invest’ in the right form of
parenting is dependent on a family’s socio-economic position (Gillies, 2005a; Nelson,
2010). Judgements about appropriate behaviour during pregnancy need to be understood
within broader concerns of who is and who is not an appropriate mother (Rothman, 2014).
Pregnant women have long been subjected to surveillance and varying degrees of
control over their behaviour, although how this is exercised changes over time (Oakley,
1986). The rise of ultrasound technologies has also reshaped the way that pregnancy is
seen with increasing focus on the foetus’s welfare (Lupton, 2013). Moreover, under-
standings of the pregnant body need to be situated within broader changes associated with
a rise of risk consciousness. Lee (2014) argues that risk consciousness in relation to
parenting cultures has four interrelated elements. First, risk is now seen as an untoward
possibility rather than a balance of probability. Second, risk is often individualised and
generalised; children are often deemed to be ‘at risk’ rather than focusing on specific risky
conditions. The third element is that ideas of risk are intertwined with or replace moral
concerns. Finally, this new understanding of risk justifies the surveillance and policing of
family life. Indeed as Lupton (2012) has argued, this is particularly true in relation to the
pregnant body with the majority of concerns focusing on the foetus. As Lupton states:
Pregnant women are represented as the carriers of the precious foetus rather than individuals
in their own right who have needs and priorities that may not always coincide with those of
the foetus. (2012, p. 331)
This notion of the ‘at risk’ foetus, within a culture that emphasises individualism, means
that pregnant women are expected to monitor themselves for potentially polluting sub-
stances and bodily states to enhance the developing foetus’s welfare (Lupton, 2012). In
other words, the construction of women as foetal carriers divides the pregnant body and
allows women to be positioned as potential abusers of the foetus.
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The notion of the foetus as a vulnerable ‘citizen’ at risk from the pregnant body has
emerged in conjunction with the rise of imaging technologies. As Lupton (2013) has
shown, the foetus is now an iconic cultural image, often viewed as free-floating rather
than located within a women’s body. Indeed the division between foetus and baby has
becoming increasingly blurred as ideas of ‘rights’ and ‘citizenship’ come to be associated
with the foetus (Lupton, 2012). It is in this context that attention and sanctions have
increasingly focused on pregnant women. For example, in different parts of Europe, the
guidance to pregnant women shifted to an abstinence position on alcohol consumption not
because of any evidence that low-to-moderate consumption was harmful, but because it
could not be proved completely safe (Leppo, Hecksher, & Tryggvesson, 2014; Lowe &
Lee, 2010). In the US, legal action has been increasingly used against poor women in the
name of foetal personhood leading to the imprisonment of women (Paltrow & Flavin,
2013). Both of these examples highlight the intertwining of moral judgements and
assessments of risk that is an integral part of risk consciousness. It also connects with a
new emphasis on the neurologically ‘damaged child’. For example, Teicher (2000) claims
that physical, psychological and sexual abuse lead to permanent changes in a child’s brain,
and suggests predictable negative outcomes. Yet there is extensive social science research
that as Munro and Musholt (2013) have shown indicates that the impact of abuse varies
and is influenced by complex social factors.
Ruhl (1999) has demonstrated that the responsibilisation of women produces notions
of control and choice, yet pregnancy outcomes are not necessarily related to women’s
will. The foetus cannot be reduced to the ‘product’ of pregnancy in a way envisaged by an
increasingly actuarial society that emphasises accounting for costs and benefits. Ruhl
(1999) argues that the shifting of responsibility to women’s behaviour ignores the com-
plex interplay of biological and social factors, many of which are outside women’s
control. Whilst pregnant women may understand and accept the general societal ‘duty
to be well’, there is a tension with being able to comply with specific regimes in practice.
Women can feel ambivalence about how others, such as health professionals and partners,
seek to control or modify their behaviour (Ogle, Tyner, & Schofield-Tomschin, 2011).
Concerns about women’s behaviour during pregnancy are not new. The idea that
women’s mental health during pregnancy has an impact on foetal development has a long
history. For example, Shildrick (2000) has documented how both lay and medical texts in
the eighteenth century raised concerns about maternal impression; the idea that a developing
foetus could be physically or mentally ‘deformed’ through an ‘over-indulgence of fear or
pleasure’ (2000, p. 255). Shildrick (2000) argues that central to these ideas are issues
surrounding women’s moral and legal status; concerns about a lack of self-restraint merge
into ideas about dangerous femininity. Consequently, whilst the suggested biological
mechanism by which foetal development is affected may have changed, there is a need to
consider how current concerns about maternal health are situated within a historical
gendered framework on how the ‘other’ always poses a risk to ‘mainstream’ society. In
other words, whether or not there are any proven biological mechanisms, it is important to
understand the broader context in which these claims are made. It is into this complex
situation that the ideas about the risk to foetuses’ brain development have emerged.
Neuroscience discourse
As Wall (2010) has noted, during the 1990s ideas about brain capacity started to be
noticeable in child-rearing discourse. Tallis (2011) makes an important distinction
between neuroscience itself (the scientific study of brain function) and neuroscientism,
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which, he argues, is looking to understand humanity in the brain. Indeed as Rose and Abi-
Rached (2013) have argued focusing on neural processes alone is reductionist and cannot
explain, or predict, social life. In this section, we intend to briefly outline key ideas from
neuroscience that are used in the policy. This is not intended to be a critique of
neuroscience itself, but to enable the policy-claims around brain development to be
contextualised.
As we have argued elsewhere (Lowe, Lee, & Macvarish, in press), a specific under-
standing of early intervention in child welfare policies seems to be built around a
reductionist argument of brain development. A central idea is that during the early
years of a child’s life, normal development will be disrupted unless the correct ‘environ-
mental influences’ ensure proper neural development. An important element to this
concept is the idea of intergenerational transmission, that people’s ability to be good
parents relates to their early childhood. The implication is that today’s ‘bad’ parents act in
this way as their brains were not developed properly, and thus they cannot be expected to
raise their children adequately unless interventions can override ‘fixed’ biological
constraints.
Bruer (1999) has shown how this understanding of brain development arises from a
particular set of ideas that have been associated with early childhood. These are devel-
opmental synaptogenesis, sensitive periods and enriched environments. Bruer (1999)
argues that whilst it is the case that developmental synaptogenesis (rapid increase in
synapse density) takes place in the early years this is not the only time this happens.
Moreover, more synapses do not necessarily mean additional brain functionality. In other
words, it is not clear that this process is linked to the future potential of children. Bruer
(1999) also notes that the idea of sensitive periods has been exaggerated. There are a small
number of skills that are time sensitive in terms of development; these are what he calls
‘species-typical’. This means that it would be extremely unlikely not to encounter them
within the general environment. For example, whilst animal experiments have shown that
depriving young of vision or from hearing certain sounds does affect their development, it
would be a rare occurrence that children were in a similar position. For example, Hubel
and Wiesel (1970) demonstrated that if you sewed newborn kitten’s eyes shut, it had a
long-term impact on their vision. However, as Bruer (1999) points out, that it is unlikely
that this level of deprivation would ever occur naturally, and most eyes would be exposed
to different forms of light needed for development even in quite adverse circumstances.
Bruer (1999) notes that species-typical development issues are exceptions and the major-
ity of skills and behaviours are learnt throughout life rather than dependant on exposure in
the early years.
The third aspect of Bruer’s (1999) critique is around what qualifies as sufficient
environment for development. Whilst very extreme neglect can lead to altered brain
development, he argues that this is not the same as saying that enriched environments
will develop better brains. Much of the work in this area has looked at the development of
children who were subjected to extreme neglect in Romania orphanages. For example,
Behen, Helder, Rothermel, Solomon, and Chugani (2008) found 46% of children who had
experienced early severe deprivation had impairment in specific cognitive domains. Yet as
Rutter et al.’s (2010) work has shown, there could be good recovery even after early
extreme neglect and that institutional deprivation was the key determinant of development
issues. Hence, whilst being raised in a ‘dysfunctional’ family may be problematic; this is
unlikely to lead to some form of brain deficit (Bruer, 1999; Wastell & White, 2012).
Despite well-established critiques, the three interlocking ideas of developmental
synaptogenesis, sensitive periods and enriched environments have been used to position
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the mother and/or parenting as a crucial biological determinant of future lives. Examples
of brain-claims are highlighted in O’Connor, Rees, and Joffe (2012) study of brain and
child development ideas in the media. They found issues such as sexual orientation and
the risk of psychiatric disorders being linked to the intra-uterine environment. These
brain-claims are part of a broader trend of claims about the ‘biological embedding’ of
the mother’s health on the developing foetus within an area often referred to as ‘foetal
programming’ (Axford & Barlow, 2014). Whilst clearly there is a link between the health
of the pregnant women and the foetus, a simplistic deterministic mechanism is likely to
overlook the complexity of both biological mechanisms and social lives. Moreover, the
idea that brain development is at risk from the pregnant body justifies health and welfare
interventions. The resulting logic is that interventions should be as early as possible,
preferably before conception, because of this specific construction of the early years as
having a unique and deterministic impact on later life chances through the developing
brain. Hence, biological claims are a crucial element in the way that risk consciousness
operates in this area.
Lawless, Coveney, and MacDougall (2014) found that there is growing interest in
infant mental health. They argue that the language of brain development has been used to
update ideas of attachment set out by Bowlby. Within the broad framework of attachment
theory, the emotional bonds that an infant develops with a primary caregiver (usually their
mother) are central to their future emotional health. As detailed assessment of infants
themselves is not possible, it is mother’s behaviour that is often monitored for potential
concerns (Lawless et al., 2014). They argue that discourses of individualised risk dom-
inate professional understandings of infant mental health and minimise attention on
structural issues such as poverty.
This particular understanding of brain development as deterministic of life chances has
had a profound impact on recent policy development. Wastell and White (2012) have
shown in the area of child welfare that there has been a shift towards medicalised
interventions in family life to try to ‘cure’ the problems. Featherstone, Morris, and
White (2013) have documented the way this has led to a shift from family support to a
specific form of child protection, with the notion that quick removal of children is always
preferable. Both these articles provide evidence for the ways in which brain development
arguments are becoming central to the identification of children ‘at risk’ and the potential
deficits that need targeting in family life. Moreover, as we have argued elsewhere (Lowe
et al., in press), this particular form of understanding leaves little capacity for children to
be considered as autonomous individuals who are active agents in their own lives. We
draw on data in this article to investigate how neuroscientific discourse are reshaping
ideas about pregnancy within the English welfare policies and the extent to which the
operation of risk consciousness within neuroscience discourses are producing particular
understandings of foetal risk.
Methods
In this article, we draw on data from a study of the emergence of ‘brain-based’ under-
standings of child development in English social and welfare policies around parenting.
The aim of the project was to trace how concepts and language taken from neuroscience
were used within policy to explain parent–child relationships and justify specific inter-
ventions in family life. In it we analysed a purposive sample of 42 documents from 1998
to 2012 to identify how ‘neuroscientific evidence’ was used in policy thinking.
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We identified potential policy documents through searches of government websites
and other records of policy development. The majority of policy documents are a matter
of public record and freely available to access. Our final selection of documents for
analysis was based on three criteria. We included documents if they: contained an in-depth
discussion of key concepts (such as parenting, brains); covered a range of social and
welfare areas (e.g., social exclusion, health and maternity services); or appeared to be
significant in the development of later policies.
We sought to map a chronological account of how neuroscience discourses emerged
as a significant issue in policy understandings of health, child development, parenting and
early-years childcare. Our final sample of documents included: policy consultation and
strategy documents published by Government departments (29); reports commissioned by
government departments (7); and reports by think tanks and advocacy groups that were
key reference points in later policy (6). Full details of the sample can be found in Lee,
Macvarish, and Lowe (2013). We thematically analysed the selected documents, a process
that involved, close reading, coding and the mapping of key terms and ideas. Members of
the research team read the documents and developed an initial coding framework. This
was refined during the analysis period through ongoing discussion within the research
team until we were confident that it reflected the issues in the data set. The coding was
then used to develop an understanding of the emerging themes. This analysis was
facilitated by NVIVO. This method of policy analysis is similar to Leppo et al. (2014).
In this article, we focus on one aspect of this analysis, how these brain discourses
construct specific understandings of pregnancy. We use quotations from the documents
that best illustrate the trends in the policies.
Findings
The ‘problem’ of pregnancy
We start our analysis of the documents by focussing on three documents that illustrate the
development of the neuroscience discourse. Following their election in 1997, the New
Labour government in the UK introduced a range of policy initiatives under a broad aim
of trying to ‘support’ parents (Gillies, 2005b). The range and scope of their policies,
which were often contradictory in their aims, mainly addressed issues relating to concerns
about crime and disorder (Gillies, 2005b). In this period, there is very little emphasis on
the ‘quality’ of women’s pregnancies. For example, in Supporting Families (Home Office,
1998) pregnancy is mentioned or alluded to in three main ways: teenage pregnancy, pre-
natal education and maternity leave. The most prominent issue is the concern about the
‘problem’ of teenage pregnancies. In the Home Office policy document teenage preg-
nancy was identified as a ‘serious’ problem but the problem was framed as a social
exclusion issue not as one of physical risk to the developing foetus as can be seen here:
Unwanted and under-age pregnancies, whether planned or unplanned, have a high personal,
social and economic cost and can blight the life chances of younger teenagers. Many already
vulnerable groups are disproportionally likely to become teenage parents, increasing the
chances that they and their children will continue to be affected by social exclusion. (Home
Office, 1998, p. 44)
The other two ways pregnancy enters the document similarly lack an emphasis on the
developing foetus. The main aim of the document was to highlight and extend the role of
parenting support, and within this document, parenting begins at birth. This can be seen
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through the lack of attention to the pre-natal period as an essential time for intervention,
instead stating that women may require support ‘around the birth of their children’ (Home
Office, 1998, p. 11). In relation to maternity leave, there is discussion about extending the
legal time periods, but no concerns about pregnancy are made specifically. This example
illustrates that at this time, the developing foetus was not a significant focus of family
policy, and in general, the need for ‘good parenting’ appears to begin after birth.
By 2003, the emphasis has changed as can be seen in a Department for Education and
Skills Research report ‘Birth to three matters’ (David, Goouch, Powell, & Abbott, 2003).
This report was a review of literature commissioned as part of the introduction of the Birth
to Three Framework. The framework was designed to provide guidance for those who
were working as childcare practitioners, and the supporting documentations such as ‘Birth
to three matters’ was intended to provide the supporting evidence for such practice. Most
of ‘Birth to three matters’ is about early childhood, but it also discusses some pregnancy
issues that may impact on the health of the foetus such as nutrition, smoking and use of
illegal substances (David et al., 2003). In the sections on pregnancy, ‘Birth to three
matters’ identified two key areas that were to dominate ideas about pregnancy in sub-
sequent policy documents: maternal stress and brain development.
‘Birth to three matters’ discussed two studies which indicated that pregnant women’s
mental health could have an impact on the developing foetus. The document outlines
Grossman et al.’s study which showed that stress during pregnancy can lead to a more
active foetus and newborn irritability (Grossman et al. in David et al., 2003, p. 58).
However, ‘Birth to three matters’ notes that such evidence does not necessarily predict
there will be any long-term issues in childhood. Furthermore, in ‘Birth to three matters’,
the discussion of the Grossman et al.’s study is in a section on ‘special babies’ and there is
no mention in this section of the developing brain as an issue. However ‘Birth to three
matters’ also cites a study by Eliot that suggests that not only does maternal smoking and
drinking have ‘detrimental influences’ on brain development but maternal emotion and
stress does as well (Eliot in David et al., 2003, p. 122). Overall ‘Birth to three matters’ is
tentative about claims that foetal brain development can be harmed by maternal behaviour
and states that neuroscience researchers ‘are cautious about claims that certain experiences
or products can boost brainpower or make long term differences’ (David et al., 2003,
p. 14).
However, by 2011 there was a marked change as the discourse of neuroscience
became more generally embedded in policy documents (see Lee et al., 2013), and
pregnancy was increasingly defined as a key site of potential intervention in developing
brains. This can be illustrated in Allen’s (2011) report published by the Cabinet Office,
‘Early intervention: the next steps’ that included the following statement:
Although poor parenting practices can cause damage to children of all ages, the worst and
deepest damage is done to children when their brains are being formed during their earliest
months and years. The most serious damage takes place before birth and during the first
18 months of life when formation of the brain governing emotional development has been
identified to be taking place. (…) Psychosocial stress during pregnancy has been linked to
increased risk for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, schizophrenia and social abnorm-
alities. (Allen, 2011, p. 15, our emphasis).
This quotation comes from a chapter entitled ‘Using our brains’ that claimed to set out the
rationale behind the government’s early intervention policy. The central rationale was that
that adult ‘dysfunctions’ (such as crime, alcohol and/or substance misuse) are related to
the inferior architecture of the brain that are formed during the early years. Importantly,
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this extract from the policy document shows how the mother’s emotional state was
deemed to be a crucial determinate. Pregnancy was clearly identified as a time when
maternal stress could negatively affect a child’s future life. Thus, ideally interventions to
reduce social problems needed to begin before conception.
These documents illustrate how in a relatively short space of time, there has been a
shift in policy concerns from the age of some mothers (teenage pregnancy) to the quality
of the pregnancy itself. Whilst issues such as substance use have been present for some
time, a new emphasis on women’s mental health during pregnancy has been constructed
as a significant risk to the developing foetus. This risk includes women already deemed to
be poor mothers, such as young women (Allen, 2011), but also potentially generalises the
risk to any woman subjected to stress during pregnancy. This duality of highlighting
specific individuals, often within a moral framework, alongside a potential generalising
trend illustrates the features of risk consciousness that are operating in the area.
Maternal mental health
In some of the earlier policy documents, whilst maternal stress was highlighted as a risk
factor for the developing foetus, it was acknowledged that the casual mechanism was
unclear. For example, in a Department for Education and Skills briefing document,
Support from the Start (Sutton, Utting, & Farrington, 2004) there was a section on stress
during pregnancy and it cited a number of studies that claimed that there was evidence
that behavioural problems, in general, and attention deficit hyperactive disorder, in
particular, could be linked to stress during gestation. Support from the Start acknowledged
that the biological process was not known and noted that there were currently no studies
that have demonstrated how to reduce stress during pregnancy, although it suggested that
family support interventions might be helpful. Whilst not specifically mentioned in this
section of the document, it becomes clearer later that the interventions were only for
specific women; those in disadvantaged neighbourhoods or of a younger age. Hence, the
emphasis was not on the general impact of maternal stress but on the impact on specific
categories of pregnant women for whom intervention might reduce risk to the developing
foetus.
By 2008, there was no longer any uncertainly that maternal anxiety and depression
had an adverse impact on neurological development of all foetuses. The Department of
Health policy document on Pregnancy and the ﬁrst ﬁve years of life in its child health
promotion programme summarised the evidence that maternal anxiety and depression had
an adverse impact on the foetal and baby’s brain in the following way:
The CHPP [Child Health Promotion Programme] needs to reflect new evidence that has
emerged about neurological development (…). It should also incorporate the information that
we have about the adverse effect that maternal anxiety and depression in pregnancy can have
on child development. A child’s brain develops rapidly in the first two years of life (…). Early
interventions directly affect the way that the brain is wired, and early relationships set the
‘thermostat’ for later control of the stress response. This all underlines the significance of
pregnancy and the first years of life (Department of Health, 2008, p. 9)
This approach is typical of policy documents of the period in that it fails to give concrete
evidence of how the neurological development of the foetus is affected. Like other policy
documents of the period, Pregnancy and the ﬁrst ﬁve years of life made reference to ‘new
understandings’ about the relationship between maternal stress and brain development but
it was not clear what these were and what evidence they were based on so it is difficult to
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properly assess such claims. Furthermore, these policy documents tended to merge
pregnancy and the post-natal period together as if there was no significant difference
between the two.
Another document from this period Early Intervention: Good Parents, Great Kids,
Better Citizens (Allen & Duncan Smith, 2008) was not an official government policy
document but is important as both authors were to become involved in policy formation
after the election of the Coalition government in 2010, Allen as author of a Cabinet Office
policy document and Duncan Smith as Secretary of State for Work and Pension. Allen and
Duncan Smith outlined a clear relationship between stress and the development of the
brain in the following way:
If a child’s early experience is predominantly characterised by fear and stress, then the
neurochemical responses to fear and stress become the primary architects of the brain, for
the simple reason that these are the responses most frequently triggered. The stress hormones,
such as cortisol, that are elevated during trauma, flood the brain like acid (Allen & Duncan
Smith, 2008, pp. 58–9 original emphasis)
Allen and Duncan Smith claimed that this adverse brain reaction led to a range of
unhealthy and antisocial behaviours such as educational failure, crime and illegal drug
use (Allen & Duncan Smith, 2008). In other words, stress needed to be avoided for the
benefit of wider society as much as the individual.
As briefly mentioned earlier, within the policy documents of this period there is often
a disregard of the difference between pregnancy and the post-natal period. This means that
the inference is that stress during pregnancy will therefore have a similar impact on the
foetus as it does on a young developing child. For example, a Cabinet Office (2006)
document on social exclusion, Reaching Out: An Action Plan on Social Exclusion,
combined the two periods in the following way:
Poor parenting can expose children to greater risks and can contribute to the development of
potentially harmful patterns of behaviour. Intensive support can improve parenting and
attachment, and can have dramatic impacts upon parent and child outcomes. (…).
Pregnancy and birth is a critical time, when it is possible to develop the resilience and
protective factors in children, thereby dramatically improving their chances of going on to
lead healthy and fulfilling lives (Cabinet Office, 2006, p. 46).
The overwhelming messages in the more recent policy documents is that mothers need to
reduce stress and bond with their babies before birth in order to prevent adverse brain
development. The policymakers in an era of austerity are concerned about short-term and
long-term cost reduction, for example preventing the development of antisocial adults as
well as enhancing child welfare. There is in these documents little discussion of the
welfare and health of pregnant women and the mothers of newborn babies.
Another important element in the policy documents is stress in pregnancy emerges as
a social class issue. While the documents cite the mediating role of biological mechanisms
of hormones such as cortisol, these mechanisms are treated differently in terms of different
social classes. The policy documents focus on stress and damage amongst disadvantaged
women, and identify these as social problems that require policy action. This emphasis is
rarely explicit in the documents and is most clearly articulated in relationship to the
‘intergenerational’ transmission of antisocial behaviour. For example, in Department for
Education’s (2011, p. 18) policy document on families with young children brain devel-
opment was identified as a key part of child development and future outcomes. The
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document identified an intergenerational cycle that needed to be broken by early
intervention:
While all families benefit from help at some point, for some the need is more acute. (…). It is
now very clear that early help and intervention is crucial if we want to support families to get
out of a cycle of poor outcomes that repeats itself over and over through the generations.
(Department for Education, 2011, p. 2).
The central message contained in these later policy documents is that stress or depression
in disadvantaged women is a causal factor in adverse foetal brain development leading to
antisocial behaviour in adults. Yet there is not a similar concern over the mental state of
more affluent women. In other words, stress in middle-class women’s lives does not seem
to have the same biological impact. This has resonances with the ideas of the dangerous
‘other’ (Gillies, 2005a).
Critical periods
The policy documents argue that potential harm to foetal and infant brains can be
minimised if interventions take place before fixed or sensitive periods. In relation to
brain development, the notion is that unless the ‘correct’ stimulation takes place, then the
brain will lose its main chance for a particular development process. For example, in
Allen’s (2011) ‘independent report’ for the government on early intervention published by
the Cabinet Office identifies ‘sensitive windows of time’ in the following way:
Different parts of the brain (governing, for example, sight, hearing, etc.) develop in different
sensitive windows of time (…). Studies show maternal depression is a prime factor in
determining behavioural problems for many children and impedes brain development (…).
These emotional deﬁcits are harder to overcome once the sensitive window has passed.
(p. 16)
In this statement there is a sleight of hand that extrapolates critical periods of development
for specific brain functions such as vision into general development of all functions partly
through the use of the word, ‘etc.’ (see Bruer, 1999 for a detailed assessment on how
different aspects of vision sensitivity occur up to the ages 8 or 9 if not beyond). The
inference in this statement is that all areas of future life are influenced by pregnant
women’s mental health. Furthermore, the document fails to note the evidence that time-
sensitive issues are related to a minority rather than the majority of child development
issues (Bruer, 1999). The document also does not actually give full details about the type
of conditions, such as the orphanages in Romania, that have been shown to lead to
significant impairments (Behen et al. (2008) and instead uses terms such as ‘infant
trauma’, ‘abuse’ and ‘neglect’. As maternal stress is constructed as ‘risk factor’ for
these, the foetus ‘at risk’ is democratised from extreme circumstances to any pregnancy
where the woman is stressed.
In many of the policy documents, the notion of critical periods was used to define
pregnancy as a key time that women were receptive to interventions. In the Department of
Health (2011, p. 4/12/109) document Preparation for Birth and Beyond, this critical
period was defined as ‘window of opportunity’:
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There is now greater understanding of how psychological factors can impact on a baby’s
development in the womb. Pregnancy is a window of opportunity, as parents are receptive to
learning and making changes.
The discussion of such critical period in documents is framed in terms of women’s social
circumstances and the impact if these on their mental health. For example, Allen and
Duncan Smith in their think-tank review in 2008 argued that during this period it is
possible to access hard to reach groups making interventions during this period particu-
larly important:
This is a critical intervention, not least since many of the hard-to-reach individuals who are, at
any other time, most resistant to public authority will respond when pregnant to a friendly and
helpful midwife or health visitor who can then open the door to others later who may help, for
example, with training or education. To put it in economic terms, it is the best investment
opportunity in our human capital: all later investments are more expensive, riskier and give
diminishing returns. (Early Intervention: Good Parents, Great Kids, Better Citizens 2008,
p. 77).
Whilst the designation of ‘hard to reach’ can cover different social groups, given the
framing of the rest of the document, this was implicitly women from lower social
economic classes. The justification presented is about the cost-effectiveness of protecting
future children. However, as the ‘risks’ only appear to be of concern about ‘othered’
women, we would argue that this needs to be understood as a moral judgement rather than
just a medical concern.
Discussion
The ways in which recent policy documents use the concept of critical period as a time
frame for both brain development and pregnancy and as a way of identifying a point of
intervention indicate that neuroscientific discourses have become central to the ways in
which family policy is written. Crucial to both brain development and pregnancy is an
understanding of population vulnerability. Foetuses are ‘at risk’ because their brains are
developing rapidly, and pregnant women, especially those from lower social classes, need
to be supervised by the state to ensure that they do not damage the foetus during these
critical periods. Moreover, this policy has developed at a point in time where we have a
‘window’ on the developing foetus through scanning technologies, and this has shifted
our understanding of the foetus towards personhood if not citizenship, discursively
separating them from their mother’s bodies before they are born (Lupton, 2013).
In a recent paper on policy and practice around neurodevelopment in children’s early
years, Glaser (2014) states that brain development is harmed pre-natally by significant
maternal stress. She references Welberg and Seckl (2001) but fails to point out that this
was an animal study and they acknowledge that as brain development is different in rats,
their study is not directly transferrable to humans. This slippage from what science has
actually found and the way that it is used in policy development is hugely problematic. It
is also the case that many of the policy documents making claims about new scientific
knowledge omit the evidence, making it difficult to assess the validity of the claims.
Taken together, this misuse and missing evidence suggest that these claims are a con-
tinuation of the gendered history of policing pregnant women (Hallgrimsdottir & Benner,
2014) rather than newly discovered risks to the developing foetus. Moreover, this needs to
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be situated within the broader framework of risk consciousness that surrounds family life
(Lee, 2014)
Broader changes in the construction of ‘good motherhood’ in which intensive mother-
hood has come to dominate understandings (Hays, 1996) alongside the shift to an
actuarial society within which women are held responsible for the outcome of pregnancy
have contributed to motherhood as beginning prior to birth and the distinction between
foetus and baby becoming blurred (Lupton, 2013). Indeed as Munro and Musholt (2013)
have noted some policymakers are using neuroscience as a rhetorical device to add weight
to political arguments. In relation to pregnancy, we would argue that whilst the idea of
(adverse) brain development is stated as the rationale, it is the underlying political
concerns about potential societal disorder from poor women’s children that is at the
heart of these policies. Risk consciousness allows these moral concerns to be individua-
lised onto the ‘vulnerable foetus’ rather than seem as part of the history of gendered
policing of (some) women’s bodies. The focus on biological rather than social under-
standings also needs to be placed within a broader framework in which children’s
development is seen as largely determined by adults (Christensen, 2000).
The idea of ‘critical periods or windows’ for intervention illustrates the extent to
which neuroscience discourse has entered the policy arena. As we have argued elsewhere,
the notion that all future potential of a child is limited by what happens to their brain in a
few specific moments in early life is clearly infant determinist (Lowe et al., in press). The
ultimate implication is that should ‘non-optimum’ conditions be present during the early
years then there is little hope of recovery. This idea is not only depressing but also has
profound implications. For example, the Children and Families Act 2014 has a reduced
emphasis on family care in favour of increasing forced adoptions and allows children to
be placed with potential adopters before any court proceedings have taken place (Ashley,
2014). Whilst ideas about neuroscience are not the only reason for this change, they are
part of the current context of child protection (Featherstone et al., 2013). These develop-
ments are a clear indication of the shift in understandings of risk as untoward possibilities
rather than balance of probabilities.
The increased emphasis on pregnancy as an essential part of the ‘critical window’
means that the gaze of policymakers is clearly focused on the intimate habits and
dispositions of the mother. This extends beyond the physical surveillance of women’s
bodies and behaviour into their minds as their mental state becomes named as a key
determinate of foetal health. It is no longer enough to eat by the rules and abstain from
activities deemed to be hazardous, (poor) women must not become stressed. However,
these policies have been developed alongside serious cuts to the welfare state, within
which welfare-dependent troubled families are deemed to need tougher rather than more
generous welfare support (Slater, 2014). Arguably, increasing levels of poverty are likely
to increase rather than reduce the stress levels in poorer pregnant women.
In this article based on a study of policy documents, we have identified similar trends
to the ones which Lawless et al. (2014) found in their study of the Australian professional
understandings of infant mental health. They argue that:
Threads from discourses of brain science, attachment theory, critical periods, children’s needs,
mothering and maternalism have woven together to shape thinking and practices around
infant mental health in often invisible ways. (Lawless et al., 2014)
The notion that pregnancy is not just a ‘critical window’ in terms of foetal development,
but also a key temporal point for intervention is also of key importance. These policies use
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neuroscience to justify the idea that early intervention is a cost-effective way of addressing
social problems and subjecting women, especially ‘risky’ women, to surveillance and
control during pregnancy is a way of furthering these policy objectives. By framing the
‘problems’ as inherently biological attention is drawn away from the continuities of social
condemnation of particular pregnancies. Yet in a time of increasing hostility towards
poorer families in addition to starker child protection policies, it is not clear that many
pregnant women will be in a position to refuse increasing surveillance and intervention.
The attention on the pregnant body needs to be understood within a wider change in
which risk consciousness has come to dominate policy development over family life. As
Leppo et al. (2014, p. 525) argued alongside the cultural image of the foetus, are the twin
images of the ‘perfect mother’ who follows expert advice and the ‘failed’ mother who has
‘taken chances’ with her child’s future health. These pressures illustrate the normalised
scrutiny of pregnancy and increasing discourse of foetus as citizen.
Conclusion
In this article, we have explored the emergence and significance of ideas about pregnancy
and the developing brain within British family policy within the broader framework of
risk consciousness. This renewed emphasis on biology is used to potentially increase the
policing and surveillance of family life. We have shown how there has been a shift from
concerns about the age of motherhood to the quality of the pregnancy itself and that this is
symptomatic with a growing emphasis on the ‘vulnerable foetus’. In recent documents,
maternal stress is identified as a risk to the developing foetus and this has the potential to
generalise to a wider population. Yet the emphasis on women living in disadvantage
undermines the claims to biology through its selective application and re-individualises
the risk. Hence, moral concerns about particular pregnancies are reconstructed as risk,
particularly through the rhetoric of ‘critical windows’. Yet the social element, women’s
openness to compliance with interventions, rather than the neurological element seems to
be the critical point. Consequently, we would argue that these policies need to be under-
stood as part of broader trends of policing of women’s bodies in the name of the foetus
rather than acting on insights from new scientific discoveries.
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